

MORAL JUDGMENT AND DELINQUENCY: THE EFFECT OF
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND PEER PRESSURE

BY

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1975

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express her special appreciation to Dr. Jacquelin Goldman without whom this study would not have been possible. Appreciation is also extended to Dr. C. Michael Levy, Jr., Dr. Wiley Rasbury, Dr. Vernon Van de Riet, and Dr. George Warheit for their support and constructive criticisms.

The author is also grateful to Mr. Don Wilkinson, Program Director, Youth Services, Georgia, and Mr. Tom Lanning, Director of the August Youth Development Center, for their cooperation in providing access to subjects used in this study. Special acknowledgements and appreciation are also expended to Miss Pat King for her consultation and support, and to the staff of the Connection School for their continued support and assistance in every aspect of this study.

To Dr. Joen Fagan, appreciation for her generous support and constructive criticisms, and to Mr. Timothy Schmidlin, appreciation for his learned advice toward the completion of this study

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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December, 1975

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The present study was addressed to the problems of:

(1) Delinquent vs. nondelinquent morality as a factor of differences in socialization experiences, and (2) The effect of peer argument to consensus on moral judgment. The MJS, a questionnaire based on 15 items from the Kohlberg interview scale, was used with three groups of 30 subjects (ages 14-17) from three different school settings; i.e., community schools for delinquents, a training school for delinquents, and a public high school (nondelinquents). The groups were equated for age, race, I.Q., S.E.S., and for the delinquents, type of offense and length of time in each program.

No significant differences were found between the subject groups in mean MJS scores which suggested that "delinquent morality" may not be different from adolescent morality in general. In addition, there was no significant effect shown for argument of moral dilemmas, which was explained in terms of the stability of the conventional stage 4. The study of situational factors in minor stage use was suggested.

INTRODUCTION

The present study was addressed to the problems of:

(1) The relationship between delinquency and moral development, (2) The effect of institutional vs. community placement on moral judgment in delinquents and (3) Peer pressure in argument to consensus as an experimental condition to effect change in moral judgments.

There is conflicting evidence concerning the relationship between delinquency and moral development. Kohlberg (1964) and Eshel, Kugelmass and Breznitz (1968) have noted that adolescent delinquents demonstrated less maturity in moral thought than nondelinquents. The delinquents in both reports responded with modes of moral thought more similar to children of the ages eight to ten, while the normal control subjects responded with the more mature modes of moral thought of normal adolescent development in the ages twelve to sixteen. However, Johnson (cited by Eshel et al., 1968) found no differences between delinquents and nondelinquents in moral maturity. Eshel et al., (1968) suggested that the failure to replicate the previous findings was due to uncontrolled differences in socioeconomic backgrounds, while reporting that institutionalized delinquents demonstrated

a lack of mature moral thought compared to lower class nondelinquents.

In a study of 10 delinquents and their families with normal controls, Hudgins and Prentice (1973) reported significantly lower moral maturity scores in the delinquent children. However, Jurkovic and Prentice (1974) failed to replicate the previous findings although in both studies the delinquents were from the same juvenile court and the families were matched on socioeconomic status.

Several reasons could be given for failures in replication and in discrepancies in the results of studies. The use of small numbers of subjects and different criteria for moral maturity are possible confounding factors between studies. Hawk and Peterson (1974) have reported that 15 delinquents (\bar{X} age = 15) scored lower on moral maturity scores than did a group of college students (\bar{X} age = 20) and a group of mental health professionals (\bar{X} age = 27). While the purpose of the above study was to investigate the relationship between moral maturity and the psychopathic deviancy scale of the MMPI, the subject groups were not directly comparable due to differences in age and educational levels.

A frequent error has been to regard delinquents as homogeneous when they appear to represent a diverse group of youth (Hoffman, 1970). Ruma and Mosher (1967) indicated, for example, that although moral judgment was related to

levels of guilt over transgressions in a delinquent sample, there existed a wide range of both guilt and morality scores. The individual differences found raised doubts about an "oversimplified view of delinquents as not experiencing guilt or as lacking a conscience" (Ruma and Mosher, 1967, p. 127). In addition, inconsistent findings may have resulted from a lack of control of types of delinquents or the effects of institutional placement.

Stein, Sarbin, Chu and Kulik (1967) pointed to the factor of institutionalization as an explanation of discrepancies in research on delinquent morality. In a criticism of research on delinquents, Rubin (1951) stressed caution in assuming that information about delinquents in reform school provides information about delinquents in general, in that an institutionalized offender is "in great part, an institution product" (p. 109). Stein et al., (1967) suggested that the next logical step was to explore the effect of institutionalization as a variable which may influence moral values.

The present study attempts to control a number of the problems mentioned above by assessing moral development in institutionalized delinquents (training school placement) and those who have had no training school experience; equated for offense type, age, I.Q., race, and socioeconomic background, with normal controls.

An additional variate explored is the effect of peer pressure in argument to consensus on moral dilemmas. Piaget (1952) hypothesized that peer pressure and social interaction represented a primary mechanism of change from egocentric (less mature) to more mature modes of moral thought. Evidence for the importance of peer agreement in areas of moral conflict has been presented by Haan, Smith and Block (1968). A study demonstrating change in moral judgments following argument to consensus of moral dilemmas has been conducted by Maitland and Goldman (1974).

The application of a cognitive developmental approach to socialization consistent with Kohlberg's (1964, 1969) theory of stage and sequence in the development of moral judgment, and the results of the study indicated above will have implications both for theory and for the treatment and rehabilitation of delinquent youth.

Moral Judgment

Kohlberg (1964, 1969) has presented theoretical and empirical support for the study of developmental stage sequences of moral judgment. The development of moral judgment was presented by Kohlberg in terms of six stages and three levels of maturity in making judgments of right or wrong actions in socially ambiguous situations.

Moral values for the first (Preconventional) level of moral judgment reside in an orientation to external punishment and reward (stage 1) and an individual hedonistic orientation (stage 2). Level II (Conventional) morality (stages 3 and 4) places value in legitimate role expectations and on conformity to the existing laws of society. Level III (Postconventional) morality finds a basis in the value of ideals and logical principles of conscience and justice (stage 6).

A child must progress through the stages of development in sequential succession. The progression from stage to stage is parallel to development of the child's moral cognitive structure. Cognitive structure in this sense refers to the patterns by which the child relates events, and is based on his existing experience of relating events in the development of a system of aspects or rules for moral judgments. Arbuthnot (1973) reported that moral maturity was related to the structural aspects of cognitive functioning, (reasoning and analysis) but not to content (nonstructural cognitive phenomena such as interests and aptitude) in a study of 85 male adolescents.

Awareness of laws and cultural prohibitions may exist from the first stage but does not appear to define the progression of following stages (Kohlberg, 1969), as does the introduction of cognitive conflict in the form of

arguments for moral reasoning within one stage of the subject's existing stage of development (Tracy and Cross, 1973; Turiel, 1966; Turiel and Rothman, 1972).

The cognitive dissonance paradigm for change in moral judgments was introduced by Turiel (1966) who presented moral dilemmas to 6th grade children with arguments one and two stages above their initial stages, and one stage below. The plus-one group increased their stage scores, while the plus-two condition resulted in no change in stage of moral development. Children presented with arguments one stage lower than their initial stage tended to regress to the lower stage in the posttest administered to all groups one month after initial testing.

Tracy and Cross (1973) adopted the Turiel change paradigm in a study of antecedents for change in moral judgments using a group of 7th grade boys. Initial stage of moral judgment was reported as the most predictive variable for subsequent change. Lower stage subjects evidenced more stage progression, with Level I control subjects increasing their total morality scores significantly more than the experimental group of Level II subjects. The increase in morality scores in the lower stage control subjects was explained in terms of the cognitive conflict introduced by the probing of the experimenter for reasons behind initial judgments. That Level II subjects were not susceptible to the

prompting of the experimenter was explained in terms of the greater stability of conventional modes of thought. As the conventional level is based on a more stable cognitive structure (Kohlberg, 1969), degree of conflict may enter as an important variable at later stages.

Progression to higher stages of moral judgment is explained by Rest (1973) as a process of preference and assimilation, whereby all lower stages are available to and comprehensible by the subject with the highest stage of ease in assimilation being the preferred mode of moral thought.

In addition, stage mixture (the use of more than one stage in responding to moral dilemmas) has been reported by Turiel (1966, 1974) as an indication of stage transition, in that an apparent regression to earlier stages as well as the use of more stages precedes developmental stage progression. Tracy and Cross (1973) reported findings which support the notion that stage mixture is an antecedent of change in moral judgments, as more stage mixture was found in the pre-conventional subjects who demonstrated greater stage progression than did the conventional subjects with less stage mixture. Kohlberg (1969) has also indicated that while the predominant adult stage in our society is stage 4, adults who remain at the earlier stages appear as less "pure" types with more stage mixture than adults who have achieved a conventional level of moral maturity.

Factors found to be related to stage of moral judgment have included age, I.Q., and socioeconomic background. Bright children may attain higher stages of moral maturity earlier than those with lower intelligence, but a bright child is equally likely to score high or low on morality scores. Less intelligent children are reported to take longer in the development of the cognitive base of the conventional stages of moral maturity, but intelligence itself is not presented as a final determining factor (Kohlberg, 1969). Age effects are explained by Kohlberg as "large groups of moral concepts...only attain meaning at successively advanced ages and require the extensive background of social experience and cognitive growth represented by the age factor" (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 386). Social factors such as socioeconomic background apparently influence the child's background of social experiences upon which his moral cognitive structure is based.

If a child, in his progression from the individual opportunistic values of stage 2, to the "good-boy" orientation of stage 3, fails to encounter or resolve cognitive conflict of stage 2 reasoning in moral judgment situations, he may form a "con-man" ideology (stage 2) found in some delinquents and adults (Kohlberg, 1969). As an example of the effects of social factors as partially determining moral development, Kohlberg (1964) has suggested that the serious

delinquent's developmental arrest in moral cognitive growth has its basis in sociocultural influences. Whereas the normal child from eight to twelve finds opportunities for reevaluating existing modes of thought, the delinquent finds little opportunity for reappraisal while living in a social environment that reinforces interpretations of early stages of moral thought. Furthermore, Kohlberg (1964) contends that the delinquent may form an amoralistic view if his perceived motives of others consistently fit his existing view of the earlier stages of development.

In summary, the cognitive developmental approach assumes that social behavior has a cognitive structure or organizational pattern whereby the process of relating events depends on prior modes developed by the individual. Stage progression refers to the hierarchical integration of lower order concepts forming higher order concepts which build upon and eventually replace the preexisting cognitive structures. The emphasis is on the cognitive hierarchical structure of organizing modes or patterns of thought, formed in an interaction of the child with his existing moral cognitive structures and the events that he encounters in his environment. Thus, the interpretation of the meaning of events presented to the child to enhance his moral maturity will depend upon his existing stage of moral judgment.

The Cognitive Developmental Approach to
Socialization of the Delinquent

Kohlberg (1969) offers support for the study of social behavior and research in socialization in terms of developmental sequence, rather than in terms of individual traits. Although delinquency occurs during adolescent development, little attention has been given to sequential stage development in appraising the problem of delinquency.

The cognitive developmental approach offers a common-sense base upon which to build workable directions in re-defining problems of the delinquent in society. In spite of an extensive body of literature attempting to explain and define the parameters of delinquency, the numbers of children entering the juvenile justice system continue to increase. Yearly statistics on crime and delinquency do not reflect the additional numbers of unofficial, non-reported delinquency. Within traditional methods of reform and corrections, more than half of the children remanded to training schools for delinquents eventually return (Scanlon and Harville, 1966). Both increases in total numbers and recidivism rates indicate the need to redefine the problem and reexamine existing treatment, philosophy and goals within the juvenile justice system.

In spite of increasing sophistication in programming goals for children, public opinion continues to demand that

the delinquent be removed from the community to be placed in a training school or institution in another community. The naive assumption is that the child's behavior can be changed to conventional standards while restricting his social learning opportunities and placing emphasis on external controls, punishment and reward. In view of the cognitive developmental approach, the above mentioned efforts would prove self-defeating; as they attempt to raise levels of moral maturity in a child's judgment of right or wrong actions to a conventional level while providing situational cues for regression to, or maintenance of, a preconventional level of moral judgments (reliance on external controls).

In a review of the theories of social learning and social attitude, Kohlberg (1969) concluded that "children living in a positive social climate will be more willing to learn, and be more accepting of, social norms than children living in a hostile or frightening climate" (p. 363). Jurkovic and Prentice (1974) presented evidence that moral judgment may be inhibited in a negative family climate. While showing that delinquency itself was not a significant variable in moral judgment, mothers whose delinquent sons were at the preconventional level of morality exhibited significantly more dominance and hostility, and less warmth and encouragement than mothers of sons at the conventional level. Since delinquent samples are defined in terms of court

intervention and adjudication, the effect of this intervention cannot be overlooked as a possible variable influencing moral judgment in delinquents. While the majority of studies have reported lower moral maturity in delinquents compared to normal controls, several problems have been noted in the interpretation of the findings.

Campagna and Harter (1975) interpreted their finding of lower moral maturity in a delinquent group (ages 10 to 13) as representing an arrest in moral development due to restricted role playing opportunities. Examination of Campagna and Harter's findings revealed that the predominant stage for both groups was at the developmental stage 2, with the delinquents having minor stage scores at stage 1 compared to the nondelinquents who had minor stage scores at stage 3.

Fodor (1972) reported that a group of delinquents, ages 14 to 17, scored lower in moral maturity than a matched group of nondelinquents. Two problems were inherent in the latter study. The first was that the matched control group was obtained from files on an earlier study, thus introducing possible differences in the experimental situation which may have affected morality scores (Kurtines and Grief, 1974). The second, and most notable point was that while total morality scores were lower for the delinquent group, the predominant stage for both groups was at stage 3. As in the study cited above, the difference between the groups

was attributable to lower stage use in minor stage scores (stage mixture) for the delinquent samples, while the predominant stage score did not distinguish between groups in either study. Fodor (1973) questioned the representativeness of an institutionalized sample while reporting that diagnosed psychopathic delinquents scored lower on moral maturity scores (predominant stages 1 and 2) compared to nonpsychopathic delinquents who were equally represented at the preconventional and conventional levels of moral maturity.

Statistics on recidivism and delinquency have shown that the younger the age of first entering the juvenile justice system (13 or below) the higher the recidivism rate through adulthood (Glueck and Glueck, 1974; Scanlon and Harville, 1966). Kohlberg (1969) and Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) suggested that the study of environmental determinants at age 13 can have long range meaning in the socialization process, since a high correlation was found between the ages of 13 and adulthood (age 24) on morality scores in a longitudinal study of moral development. A regression in stage responses for 3 of 6 delinquents was also reported following training school placement. Further research is clearly indicated on how training school placement, as well as other ways in which the delinquent finds narrowed opportunities for social learning affects the child's acceptance

or rejection of more mature modes of thought.

Whereas delinquency itself may or may not be directly related to moral judgment, theoretical and empirical support has been advanced for the notion that the level of moral maturity is a correlate of social action (Kohlberg, 1964). Swanson (1973) reported that for unofficial delinquents a personal control measure reflecting acceptance or rejection of deviance was a strong predictor of deviant or conforming behavior. The personal control measure was reported to have increased significantly in acceptance of deviance in a reform school population (Personal communication with Dr. Swanson). Since the level of moral maturity and acceptance of deviancy have been reported to be related to social action, the above findings suggest that the increasing numbers of delinquents and high recidivism rates may reflect the effects of the intervention of the juvenile justice system; which inadvertently through efforts at rehabilitation may restrict the child's social learning opportunities for moral development.

An important factor in the socialization of delinquents would be the type of cognitive conflict available to them within the rehabilitation system. In the vast majority of rehabilitative programs, delinquents are grouped with peer delinquents. Kohlberg (1971) has observed that many reform schools have an "official level of justice which is a stage

1 obedience and punishment orientation, while the inmate peer culture has a stage 2 instrumental exchange orientation" (p. 193). Kohlberg (1971) further suggests that an inmate high on either one of these cognitive stage structures would not be likely to advance to higher stages while in the institution.

Eshel et al. (1968) concluded that the "lack of mature judgment may be an obstacle in any rehabilitative program" (p. 74), after finding that institutionalized delinquents scored lower on a test of moral judgment than did lower class controls. The conclusion that the lower levels of delinquent morality present an obstacle to rehabilitation raises the question of the reevaluation of existing treatment methods in terms of their effectiveness in raising levels of moral judgment.

Kohlberg and Hickey have instituted programs based on Kohlberg's theory of moral development using guided peer discussion in a boy's reformatory and a woman's prison (Cockerham, 1975). The group meetings were organized around the format of perceived justice and peer group responsibility for ongoing programs. The guided discussion was aimed at presenting successive stage arguments in an attempt to raise levels of moral judgment in group members. Scharf, Hickey and Moriarty (1973) reported significant advances in stages of moral judgment in delinquent participants of such

groups. The advances in moral modes of thought demonstrated that the delinquents were not fixed in their moral ideologies. Lower recidivism rates were reported for participants of both programs compared to nonparticipants from the same institutions.

Peer Group Consensus

The effect of conformity to group pressures has been widely studied as a factor in delinquent group behavior. The form of peer pressure to which the present study is addressed is the aspect of group consensus on moral dilemmas following argument of the different stages represented in the peer group. Murray (1972) concluded that social conflict in a group consensus situation was an important mediator of cognitive growth after finding that young children attained more mature judgments in conservation when required to reach group decisions about a series of conservation problems. Maitland and Goldman (1974) reported significant increases in adolescent moral judgments following argument to consensus of moral dilemmas derived from the Kohlberg scale, while finding that discussion of the same issues without requiring group consensus resulted in no change in moral judgments.

Earlier investigators have reported the "risky-shift

phenomenon" occurring when unanimous group decisions concerning matters of risk show a shift toward greater risk taking compared to prediscussion moral attitudes (Wallach, Kogan and Bem, 1964; White and Minden, 1969). Myers, Schreiber and Viel (1974) have studied the effect of group consensus with groups of college males and convicted felons on three choice dilemmas and three ethical-legal dilemmas. It was reported that both groups, students and felons, significantly increased their preference for legally deviant action following discussion of both types of dilemmas with no change occurring following the three choice dilemmas. Thus, unanimous group decisions appear to effect conflict in cognitive areas resulting in change of moral and ethical-legal preferences, but not in the noncognitive realm of behavioral choices. Since the concept of peer group interaction has been accepted as a major mode of treatment of delinquency and at times peer resolution of conflict requires unanimous group decisions, further research is indicated as to the effect of peer group consensus on moral judgment.

In summary, it is clear from the studies cited above that the cognitive developmental approach to socialization may offer both a clearer definition of the delinquent morality as well as a workable approach in the treatment and rehabilitation of delinquent youth. However, the problem

of delinquent morality has not been clearly demonstrated while controlling for possible contributing individual and social factors, including intelligence, age, socioeconomic background and type of offender. The effect of the consensus of the peer group as well as the effect of the intervention of the juvenile justice system and subsequent incarceration of delinquent youth are also suggested influences on the development of moral values. The purpose of the present study is to investigate the problem of delinquent morality while controlling for differences between delinquents and normal controls on the variables mentioned above. Other variables to be controlled are race and for the delinquents, the length of time spent in their respective programs.

Hypotheses

The first two hypotheses are directed toward the problem of moral judgment in delinquents and nondelinquents, and to the effect of different socialization experiences on delinquent morality (training school placement vs. community placement with no training school experience).

Peer interaction on a moral conflict has been shown to effect change in moral judgments in nondelinquents (Maitland and Goldman, 1974). This raises the question of the use of this method to experimentally enhance moral judgment in delinquents. Hypotheses three and four are

addressed to the problem of experimentally inducing change in moral judgment across three groups with different socialization backgrounds (school experiences)

Hypothesis 1. There will be no significant differences in initial moral judgment scores between community placed delinquents and nondelinquents.

2. Training school delinquents will have lower scores on initial moral judgment than will community placed delinquents.
3. Peer interaction with argument to consensus on moral dilemmas will enhance moral judgment scores across all subject groups.
4. Ongoing peer interaction in a school setting without presentation of a moral argument will not affect moral judgment across subject groups.

METHOD

Subjects

The subjects were 90 males, ages 14 through 17, drawn from three different school settings.

Community delinquents (CD). Thirty subjects were drawn from three community based schools for delinquents in the Atlanta areas. The CD subjects were residing at home and attending school daily. They had no prior train-school experience but had spent from one to three months in a juvenile detention facility awaiting trial. The community placements were made available to delinquent youth in Georgia as an alternative to institutional placement (Powell and Serrill, 1974). The CD group had a mean age = 16 (SD = .80), I.Q. = 94.6 (SD = 9.96); and had spent an average of 5.66 months in their school programs.

Institutional delinquents (ID). The thirty ID subjects were residents of the Youth Development Center in Augusta, Georgia. The subjects were drawn from four classrooms on the basis of age (\bar{X} age = 15.6; SD = .97), I.Q. (\bar{X} I.Q. = 94.5; SD = 9.94), and had spent an average of 4.93 months in the institution.

Both offender groups were approximately equated for types of offenses. There were 7 status offenders (runaway, ungovernable and truant), 20 misdemeanor offenders (minor theft, drug and alcohol abuse) and 3 serious offenders (armed robbery, aggravated assault and serious arson) in each group.

Nondelinquent (ND). Thirty subjects were chosen from six study hall classes in a public high school in the Atlanta area on the basis of the student's availability for all phases of the study as well as age (\bar{X} age = 15.7, SD = .95), I.Q. (\bar{X} I.Q. = 94.2, SD = 9.63), race and socioeconomic level. To insure their nondelinquent status, self reports and school records were obtained about appearances before the juvenile court. All ND subjects had no prior record of court appearances.

The Culture Fair I.Q. was administered to all groups. There were 17 negroes and 13 whites in each subject group. The majority of the subjects were from lower middle socioeconomic levels as based on parent's occupation (1 = unskilled; 2 = semi-skilled; 3 = skilled occupations). Each subject group had a mean socioeconomic status (S.E.S.) of 2.03. Means and standard deviations for age, I.Q., S.E.S., and for the offender groups, time spent in their respective programs were similar for all groups with no significant differences between the groups on the above variables tested with separate one way analyses of variance.

Instrument

The Moral Judgment Scale (MJS) was derived by Maitland and Goldman (1974). The MJS was based on the theoretical framework of the Kohlberg system while adapting Kohlberg's dilemmas and interview procedure to questionnaire form.

The MJS is composed of 15 items with each item concerning one of the major issues of moral judgment. The six multiple choice answers for each item may be scored with a range from 1 to 6, with each score representing a stage of moral judgment. Individual scores are obtained by summing across the 15 items and range from 15 to 90. Low scores represent lower levels of moral judgment where high scores represent the more mature level of moral judgment.

Procedure

The MJS was administered to small groups of 5 to 10 students in their respective school settings. In each subject group, 15 subjects were randomly chosen for the treatment condition, with 15 subjects serving as controls. The 15 subjects in each treatment group were placed into 3 subgroups of 5 members each for argument to consensus. Subgroup placement was influenced by the availability of subjects in classrooms for the consensus group meetings.

Treatment Phase

Five days after the initial MJS testing, the treatment subgroups in each school setting met with the following instructions to argue to consensus on five items from the MJS. Items #1, 3, 7, 12 and 14 were used in the treatment condition. (These items are included in Appendix A.) The control subjects did not meet in small groups but were subject to the ongoing socialization experiences of their respective schools. The instructions were as follows:

You have each been chosen for a special part of this study. Each of you have seen the questions you will argue today and each of you have different ideas about the ways of acting or thinking about these situations. Sometimes when situations like these come up, people with different ideas have to get together and agree on the right and wrong ways of solving the problem.

Today you will argue these problems until each of you agree on one answer for everyone here. Each will argue from your own point of view. State your reasons why you think one answer is better than the others and try to convince the others here to agree with you. It is important for each problem that you will finally agree on one answer. voting is not the procedure to be used.

You have up to forty-five minutes to argue the five dilemmas that have been given to you. There are no easy solutions to a dilemma but each of you can work with the others to come up with the best solution.

I will leave you to argue these yourselves, but I will be in the next room. Do you have any questions?

This is a very important part of the study and I appreciate your seriousness in arguing for what you think is right.

No others were present during the consensus group meetings. Each subgroup was taped for review by the experimenter of the group's ability to follow instructions. The instructions and testing were done by two female experimenters, one negro and one white. Since the experimenters were known by some of the offender subjects, the subjects were told that their performance on any of the tests would have no effect on their records or eventual release from the programs.

Post-Treatment Phase

Posttesting on the 15 items of the MJS was administered to all groups five days after the treatment groups met and ten days after pretesting. In both the ND and CD groups, there were 4 and 3 subjects, respectively, who were tested one to three days later due to their nonattendance on the day the posttest was administered. The subjects took approximately thirty minutes to complete the MJS and some required help with some of the word meanings at pre- and posttesting.

RESULTS

Pretest MJS Scores

A one way analysis of variance was performed to test the hypotheses that: (1) The ND and CD groups would not differ on initial MJS scores, while (2) the CD and ID groups would differ at pretest. Although there were mean differences in mean MJS scores across the three groups (ND \bar{X} = 59.967, SD = 7.127; CD \bar{X} = 56.567, SD = 5.710; ID \bar{X} = 56.233, SD = 6.553) on pretest, these differences were not significant ($F = 3.0406$, $df = 2/87$).

A post-hoc comparison was performed on the mean differences since: (1) Hudgins and Prentice (1973) have reported that the analysis of variance may be a highly conservative test for moral judgment scores, and (2) The F ratio fell short of significance by a value of .03. However, no significant differences were obtained using the Neuman Keuls method (Kirk, 1968).

The pretest mean scores were observed to be lower for the 6 serious offenders (\bar{X} = 54.66) than for the 14 status offenders (\bar{X} = 57.79), however, this difference was not significant ($t = 1.00$).

A complicating factor in statistically defining

trends in the present study was the amount of stage mixture across all groups which precluded assigning single stage scores to individual subjects for the purposes of a Chi Square analysis. Therefore, frequency tables and percentage distributions are presented descriptively in order to describe apparent trends. Subjects were scored according to Kohlberg's definition of pure stage as that used 50% of the time with the next used stage occurring less than 25% of the time. Both delinquent groups showed greater amounts of stage mixture with the CD group having the least number of subjects that could be scored for pure stage. The percentages of pure stage subjects on pretest were: CD = 13%, ID = 20% and ND = 33%.

A descriptive analysis of stage usage was performed in terms of percentages of stage responses for each group at pretest. The percentages were obtained by dividing the number of responses at each stage by the total number of responses (N = 450) for each group of thirty subjects. Observation of Table 1 reveals that stage 4 responses were the most typical (modal) response across all three groups, and that subjects in the ND group as a whole exhibit a lower percentage of stages 1 and 2 (preconventional responses) than subjects in the ID and CD groups. A similar pattern of responding was observed on posttest scores where stage 4 was the modal stage for all groups.

Table 1
 Percentage of MJS Stage Responses for Three Groups
 (Pretest Scores)

	Stage					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
ID	13.77	11.77	12.88	27.33	15.77	18.44
CD	10.88	14.22	14.22	26.22	16.00	18.44
ND	8.22	10.22	14.22	30.22	15.11	22.00

Posttest MJS Scores

The hypothesis of increased MJS scores following argument to consensus was not supported by the present results. A 2 X 3 factorial design with an analysis of covariance was used to test for differences at posttest. The pretest MJS scores were used as the covariate. No significant differences were found between the treatment and control conditions ($F = .128$, $df = 1/83$), or between treatment groups ($F = .098$, $df = 2/83$), or in interaction between groups and experimental conditions ($F = 1.109$, $df = 2/83$).

Group means and standard deviations for the mean item (stage) scores are presented in Table 2. Observation of Table 2 reveals the the pre- to posttest mean change appeared to decrease slightly in all groups and conditions with the exception of the ID treatment group. The greatest decrement was in the ND treatment group which also had the highest pretest mean score, however this decrement between pre- and posttest mean scores was not significant ($t = 1.19$).

Test-retest reliabilities were obtained for the control groups ($N = 15$). Whereas the ND ($r = .71$, $z = 2.66$, $p < .01$) and the ID ($r = .64$, $z = 2.39$, $p < .05$) controls evidenced significant test-retest reliability, the reliability for the CD control group did not reach significance ($r = .36$, $z = 1.35$).

Tables 3 and 4 present the mean stage scores for the

Table 2

MJS Stage Scores: Means and Standard Deviations
for Treatment and Control Conditions

(N = 15)

		Experimental		Control	
		Pre	Post	Pre	Post
ND	M	4.22	4.03	3.78	3.67
	SD	.45	.50	.40	.44
CD	M	3.80	3.61	3.75	3.74
	SD	.43	.44	.33	.42
ID	M	3.76	3.79	3.74	3.62
	SD	.38	.61	.50	.53

Table 3

Pre- and Posttest Mean MJS Stage and Consensus Scores for
5 Treatment and 10 Nontreatment Items by Subgroups

(N = 15)

	Subgroup								
	ND 1	ND 2	ND 3	CD 1	CD 2	CD 3	ID 1	ID 2	ID 3
5 Items									
Pre	3.44	4.20	3.88	4.04	5.88	3.84	4.00	3.16	3.44
Con- sensus	4.40	3.00	3.40	3.20	4.40	3.60	3.60	4.40	3.20
Post	3.60	3.76	3.44	3.40	3.44	3.72	3.60	3.84	3.24
10 Items									
Pre	4.56	4.22	4.44	3.64	3.16	3.40	3.72	3.94	3.96
Post	4.36	3.90	4.48	3.62	3.46	3.90	3.76	4.32	3.64
Total Items									
Pre	4.18	4.21	4.25	3.77	4.06	3.55	3.81	3.68	3.78
Post	4.11	3.85	4.13	3.55	3.45	3.84	3.70	4.16	3.50

Table 4

Pre- and Posttest Mean MJS Scores for 5 Treatment
and 10 Nontreatment Items by Control Subgroups

(N = 15)

	Subgroup								
	ND 1	ND 2	ND 3	CD 1	CD 2	CD 3	ID 1	ID 2	ID 3
5 Items									
Pre	3.56	3.60	3.48	3.52	3.36	3.68	3.56	3.40	3.84
Post	3.84	3.52	3.48	3.44	3.28	4.00	3.24	3.20	3.44
10 Items									
Pre	3.76	3.92	4.00	3.82	4.18	3.58	3.86	3.78	3.78
Post	3.38	3.90	3.82	3.96	4.24	3.28	4.06	3.18	4.14
Total Items									
Pre	3.69	3.81	3.82	3.72	3.90	3.61	3.76	3.65	3.80
Post	3.53	3.77	3.70	3.78	3.92	3.52	3.78	3.18	3.90

Table 5

Frequency of Change Scores from Pretest on 5 Items, 3 Groups
with Consensus Higher, Lower Than or Equal to Pretest Score

Group	Consensus Score								
	Lower			Equal to Pretest			Higher		
	ND	CD	ID	ND	CD	ID	ND	CD	ND
Pre to Post Change Score									
Increase	0	0	2	3	6	7	13	14	14
Decrease	21	22	16	2	5	4	3	5	3
No Change	10	2	6	18	12	13	5	9	10

of change scores by stage of consensus score indicated a trend towards more conformity to lower stage arguments. The mean percentage of item scores remaining at or changing toward the consensus score for all the subgroups on posttest were: Level I = 72.6%, Level II = 64%, and Level III = 57%.

The frequencies of consensus scores by stage are presented in Table 6. A comparison of the distribution of pre- and posttest scores with the distribution of consensus stage scores demonstrated that the typical response over all groups and phases of this study was at the conventional level.

The tape recordings of the treatment subgroups were rated by an independent observer to determine whether instructions were followed in the treatment condition. The items were rated by subgroup for level of argument (high, medium and low involvement), and as to whether consensus was reached by all. High and medium levels of argument resulted in a higher percentage of change equal to or toward the consensus score, with the most obvious effect of level of argument showing in the ND group (See Table 7).

Failure to reach group consensus was scored if one or more member stated disagreement to the group consensus at the end of the argument and where consensus was reached by the majority rule. Observation of Table 8 reveals that attaining group consensus resulted in a higher percentage of

Table 6
 Frequency of Consensus Scores by Stage
 (N =15)

		Stage					
		1	2	3	4	5	6
ND		2	0	5	5	1	2
CD		1	2	1	7	4	0
ID		0	2	4	6	2	1

five treatment (argued in consensus subgroups) and ten non-treatment items for the subgroups in the experimental and control conditions. Examination of both tables reveals that slight decrements occurred from pre- to posttest in the majority of the subgroups. However, Table 3 shows that in all cases the pre- to posttest change for the five items was in the direction of the consensus score. The two subgroups that had group consensus higher than pretest also increased their scores on posttest (ND 1 and ID 2). However, only in the ID 2 subgroup did this difference appear to be substantial.

Since two of the control subgroups also increased in posttest mean scores for the five items, individual subject-item responses for the five items were examined in relation to the consensus score on each item. Table 5 shows that when the consensus scores were lower than the pretest scores, positive change scores were virtually absent, with only two items in the ID subgroups falling into that category. Decreased change scores were also less likely to occur with consensus higher than pretest. The pattern of change scores indicates that where a substantial number of subject-item responses showed no change from pre- to posttest, the changes that occurred following the treatment was most often in the direction of the group consensus score.

The effect of the consensus scores on change scores was noted over all stages and subgroups. The percentages

Table 7

Mean Percentage of Change Scores Equal to and In the
Direction of Group Consensus by Level of Argument

	Level of Argument		
	High	Medium	Low
ND	80.0	56.0	34.2
CD	60.0	45.7	33.3
ID	40.0	50.0	20.0

Table 8

Mean Percentage of Change Scores Equal to and In the
Direction of Consensus Score by Consensus Reached

	Consensus			
	Reached		Not Reached	
	a	b	a	b
ND	33.33	17.77	13.33	23.33
CD	31.11	24.44	16.66	30.00
ID	35.00	10.00	14.28	20.00

Note: a indicates posttest equal to consensus

b indicates posttest in the direction of
consensus.

change equal to the consensus score, while failing to reach consensus resulted in a trend toward higher percentages of change scores in the direction of the majority consensus score. Consensus was reached on 9 of the 15 items argued for the ND and CD groups, and on 8 items by the ID group.

DISCUSSION

The results of the present study supported the hypothesis that noninstitutionalized delinquents would not differ from nondelinquents on initial MJS scores. Two of the hypotheses were not supported in that institutionalized delinquents did not differ from either of the other two groups on initial MJS scores and there was no significant change from pre- to posttest total MJS scores due to argument to consensus. However, pre- to posttest changes on the items argued were in the direction of the group consensus.

Moral Judgment and Delinquency

The present finding of no significant differences between the delinquent and nondelinquent groups on MJS scores is in agreement with the findings of Johnson (cited by Eshel et al., 1968), and with Jurkovic and Prentice (1974); and at variance with reports of lower moral judgment in delinquents (Kohlberg, 1964; Fodor, 1972; and Campagna and Harter, 1975).

Hudgins and Prentice (1973) reported a trend toward lower morality scale scores in their delinquent sample when using the analysis of variance as the statistical test for these scores. A conversion to moral maturity scores was

reported to result in significant differences between the delinquent and nondelinquent groups. Jurkovic and Prentice (1974) failed to replicate the previous findings while using the same analysis on moral maturity scores of a comparable sample. In fact, the delinquents in the latter study were found to score somewhat higher (\bar{X} moral maturity score = 261.25) than the nondelinquents in the Hudgins and Prentice report. Hudgins and Prentice (1973) reported mean moral maturity scores of 208 for the delinquents and 250 for the nondelinquents. The comparison of differences in moral maturity reported for two delinquent samples from the same juvenile court, matched on similar criteria for offense and S.E.S., suggests a wide range of individual differences across groups of delinquents in terms of moral development as measured by the Kohlberg method. Others have reported findings suggesting that delinquency as a global concept (Hoffman, 1970) represents a wide range of individual differences in moral judgment (Fodor, 1973; Ruma and Mosher, 1967).

While dominant stage scores failed to distinguish between the delinquent and nondelinquent samples in two of the studies reporting lower morality scores for delinquents, minor stage usage appeared to separate the nondelinquents from the delinquents (Campagna and Harter, 1975; Fodor, 1972). In an additional study, Fodor (1973) reported that

while nonpsychopathic delinquents were equally represented at the preconventional and conventional levels, the psychopathic delinquents were primarily at the conventional stages.

Kohlberg (1964) reported that in a previous study a group of serious delinquents were significantly lower in morality scores than nondelinquents. However, the 6 serious offenders included in the present study did not score significantly lower in MJS scores than the 14 status, noncriminal offenders. Kohlberg (1964) further stated that aspects of the delinquent's personality and situation which are not specifically moral are probably of greater significance in the causation of delinquency than modes of moral thought; while both in turn are related to the background of social learning experiences available to the child.

The research on moral judgment in delinquents is limited. Two major limitations within the area of research are: (1) The use of different definitions of morality as representing universal stages in development or as in terms of deviance from social norms, and (2) The definition of delinquency as amoral conduct. Stein et al. (1967), for example, attempted to experimentally test dimensions of adolescent morality by an index of covert conduct, i.e., delinquent vs. nondelinquent as a two-fold classification of moral and amoral conduct. The main indication of differences between the delinquent and non delinquent groups occurred on

the dimension of "informing on others". However, Kohlberg (1964) pointed to the apparent misconception of morality as being tied to the "moral" code of the delinquent gang. Not informing on others, a prevalent norm in the delinquent subculture, is presented as a code which the delinquent obeys but it is not perceived as a moral code or one that is conformed to for internalized moral reasons.

Delinquency has been related to immature morality in terms of overt aggression and hostility in institutionalized and deprived delinquents (Redl and Wineman, 1952) and in terms of church attendance (Glueck and Glueck, 1974). While these and similar factors may be relevant to the delinquent population in general, both reflect the concept of morality in terms of what the greater numbers of a given society believe to be "right" (Berkowitz, 1964) rather than in terms of defining the progression of the rules by which individuals make moral judgments. If "illegal" is assumed to equate "amoral" then the concept remains untested in the present study. However, when morality is defined in terms of Kohlberg's (1964, 1969) theory of the development of cognitive structures or rules by which an individual makes decisions about moral issues, then the concept of a delinquent morality as being separate from adolescent morality in general is not supported by the present results.

Effect of Institutional Placement on MJS Scores

There was no clear indication that institutional placement had an effect on the MJS summation scores. Kohlberg (1971) has observed that many reform schools have an official level of justice at stage 1, with the predominant stage for the peer delinquent morality at stage 2. Observation of the percentages of responses for each stage over all items indicated that the delinquents in the present study tended to rely on the preconventional stages more than the ND group (Campagna and Harter, 1975; Fodor, 1972). The ID subjects demonstrated a slightly higher percentage of stage 1 responses while the CD group tended to rely more on stage 2 responses than the other two groups.

A limitation of the present study in discerning effects of institutional placement on MJS scores was that although the CD group had no previous training school experience, all of the CD subjects had spent from 1 to 3 months in a juvenile detention facility. The reliance on external controls and obedience to authority was observed to be greater in the detention center, which was characterized by a jail-like atmosphere with locked cells and few rehabilitative measures. The training school, however, was for the most part characterized by cottage living and an open door policy.

Another complicating factor in failing to clearly separate groups on indications of reliance on external authority (stage 1 responses) was the apparent atmosphere of the public school setting from which the nondelinquents were drawn. The rules of sitting quietly and no talking in the study hall classes were authoritatively announced at regular intervals. Failure to comply was met with suspension from school or 10 days in after school "detention" (additional study hall). Haney and Zimbardo (1975) pointed to the similarities between some public schools and reform schools in terms of both impersonal architectural design of the facilities and strict and impersonal administrative control.

Berk, Fox and Waks (1972) and Kohlberg (1971) have suggested that the moral development of teachers and school administrators as well as the perceived justice of the school policies by students are factors which may distinguish between the effects of different school settings on the development of the students' moral judgment.

Although advanced as incidental evidence, the percentages of preconventional stage responses in all subject groups may reflect the perceived justice in each of the socialization groups, ranging from a strictly authoritative public high school setting (ND), to a jail-like detention center background (CD), to a detention center background combined with reform school placement (ID).

The high amount of stage mixture found in all subject groups is in agreement with other reports of high stage mixture in adolescents and college students (Berk et al., 1972; Haan et al., 1968; Maitland and Goldman, 1972). Although both delinquent groups appeared to have more evidence of stage mixture than the nondelinquent group the CD group was highest in numbers of subjects with a mixed stage score (less than 50% of the responses occurring at one stage). The CD group had 4 subjects that could be scored for pure stage while the ND group had 10 pure stage subjects.

Turiel (1974) presents evidence for his hypothesis that increased stage mixture and apparent regression to earlier stages involves a phase of "conflict or disequilibrium" indicating a reliance on earlier modes of thought "while the existing mode is being reevaluated and a new mode constructed" (p. 14). Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) reported regressive changes in 20% of their sample of students who entered liberal arts colleges from a predominant stage 4 mode of thought to an increase in both stage 2 responses and self reported delinquent acts. A similar regression was noted for 3 of 6 delinquents following placement in reform school and jail. The regressive changes in moral development for the college students were explained as related to the character of the college setting and the effect of leaving the "moral environment" of their homes. It is conceivable

the regressive changes noted in the delinquents could also be interpreted as the effect of leaving the moral environment of their homes, and the characteristics of the institution. In a study of self reported delinquency in 54 male undergraduates, Follman, Miller and Burg (1972) reported that the undergraduates were not different from a comparison sample of 66 male delinquents (ages 18 - 21) on two delinquency prediction scales.

Although the three socialization groups in the present study did not differ on total MJS scores, differences in patterns of stage mixture may reflect differences in socialization experiences, consistent with earlier reports of minor stage usage in delinquent samples and greater stage mixture in college students. That the CD group was highest on stage mixture, with low test-retest reliability, could indicate that the test was not appropriate for these subjects or that they were involved in more stage transition than the other groups. Since the CD subjects were involved in intensive therapeutic and academic programs geared to their individual levels and needs, the possibility of greater disruption in their existing stage structures would be consistent within the cognitive developmental approach to socialization. Future research is needed to test the assumptions of stage mixture and socialization experiences in moral development.

Peer Group Consensus

The present results failed to support the hypothesis that argument to consensus in a peer group would enhance MJS scores. The most obvious explanation for this finding was that the pretest modal score for all groups was at the conventional level, stage 4, with consensus scores typically falling at the conventional level (stages 3 and 4 were equally used as group consensus by the ND group), with a result of posttest scores also showing a predominance of stage 4 responses. This pattern of no change in predominately conventional responses is consistent with reports of greater difficulty in experimentally effecting change in conventional level subjects. Arbuthnot (1975) found that subjects confronted with role playing arguments equal to or lower than their predominant stage evidenced no significant increase in moral judgment scores.

The clustering of mean MJS scores close to the mean of the scale, with a trend for higher mean scores to decrease and lower mean scores to increase on posttest indicated the effect of a regression toward the mean. However, this interpretation is questioned by: (1) The conventional stage 4 has been shown to be both the predominant mode of responding in adult male society, and the most stable, unchanging mode in experiments effecting change in moral

judgments (Kohlberg, 1969; Tracy and Cross, 1973) and (2) Where a substantial number of responses did not change from pre- to posttest, the direction of the change scores per treatment item was for the most part in the direction of the group consensus score.

Group consensus appeared to affect change scores but did not result in increased posttest scores as reported by Maitland and Goldman (1974) for immediate posttest after argument of the 15 items of the MJS. In a comparison of immediate and one week delayed posttest on changes in moral judgment, Arbuthnot (1974) presented findings which suggested that increased moral judgment scores on immediate posttest may represent an immediate response to disequilibrium from confrontation with more mature judgments in a role playing situation. However, in time the positive effect may be moderated to allow for more generally positive structural changes. Slight decreases have been observed in the amount of change in moral judgment scores from immediate to delayed posttest (Arbuthnot, 1974, 1975). The results of the present study cannot be adequately explained in terms of the delayed posttest, however, since the generally positive changes that were reported by Arbuthnot were not observed.

While the majority of responses at all phases of the study were at the conventional level, there appeared to be a greater tendency for change to the preconventional arguments.

The apparent preference for lower stage arguments is difficult to interpret, and may have been confounded by level of argument and consensus reached. Stage 1 arguments accounted for most of the preference for preconventional stage arguments. In the three subgroups using stage 1 consensus scores the level of argument was medium in two groups and high in the third (CD) and consensus was reached in all subgroups.

McCandless and Evans (1973) have stated that unanimity of group consensus produced greater conformity to group pressures in the studies reviewed. The present results also showed that consensus reached by all resulted in more change equal to the group consensus than failure to attain unanimous group decisions. The explanation of verbal learning as a factor influencing change scores was suggested by the higher percentage of posttest scores equal to consensus in the subgroups that reached consensus. However, since failure to reach consensus resulted in a tendency to move toward the consensus score, and since level of argument (involvement in presenting alternative arguments that would induce more cognitive conflict) was related to the amount of change per item argued in terms of percentage scores, the explanation of cognitive conflict in a peer group was suggested as a mechanism for change in agreement with Murray (1972).

The type of cognitive conflict and the individual's involvement with issues directly relevant to his situation

may be important factors in producing long term changes in moral judgments, as have been suggested by Scharf et al. (1973), in their report on guided peer discussion groups for delinquents.

Although the hypothesized main effect of the treatment was not supported by the present results for total MJS scores, descriptive analyses of the change scores indicated that certain aspects of the consensus groups appeared to affect the direction of change scores; such as consensus reached and level of argument, as well as the direction of the group consensus score. Further research is needed in order to draw inferences beyond the present study concerning the effect of group consensus on change scores.

Implications for Theory and Future Research

The implications for the treatment of delinquency are that socialization experiences as well as peer group pressures contribute to the pattern of stage usage in moral judgment situations. Rehabilitation of the delinquent may be affected by the operation of these factors.

Several areas for future study of adolescent morality have been suggested. Immediate vs. delayed posttest studies using the MJS with samples from different socialization backgrounds would further clarify the discrepancies between the present findings and the positive increases in MJS scores on

immediate posttest reported by Maitland and Goldman (1974). Conformity to group consensus vs. cognitive conflict in effecting change in moral judgments was suggested for future research by apparent trends in the present results.

The problem of stage mixture as a factor separating delinquent and nondelinquent samples in previous studies was reviewed and in combination with the present findings of stage mixture and patterns of stage usage, suggested that the use of minor stages may be affected by situational factors. Institutionalization and other ways in which social learning opportunities may be restricted in both delinquent and nondelinquent samples may be reflected in minor stage scores.

The finding that delinquency as a global concept did not differ from adolescent morality in general raises theoretical questions as to the relationship between moral judgment and behavior. Although, theoretically, according to the Kohlberg framework, the same act may be performed by persons using reasoning and justification based on different stages of moral development, attempts have been made to show a relationship between the cognitive and behavioral realms of morality. Relationships between moral judgment and specific behavioral choices have been previously reported (Kohlberg, 1964; Kurtines and Grief, 1974; Turiel and Rothman, 1972). The present study cannot be viewed as

providing either support or nonsupport for the question of the relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior due to: (1) The global nature of the definition of delinquency and (2) The same delinquent act could theoretically occur with persons using rationales based on cognitive structures of different stages of moral development.

A problem with generalizing from the present sample was that the nonreader was not included due to the reading requirements of the MJS. Since low reading and academic achievement levels have been reported to be predictive factors of delinquency (Jones and Blaney, in press) a proportion of the delinquent population was not represented in the present sample. In addition, the problem of middle class delinquency was not directly investigated. Studies of the nonreader and the middle class delinquent are needed in order to support the present findings that delinquents as a group do not differ from normal adolescent morality.

The MJS requires further study in more direct comparison to other scales of moral development in order to further validate the present findings. While offering a more readily administered test of moral judgment than the involved interview technique, the MJS also affords further experimentation of construct validity in response to criticisms (Kurtines and Grief, 1974) of validation studies of Kohlberg's theory of moral development.

APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTIONS AND ITEMS* FROM THE MJS

*Treatment Item (# 1,3,7,12,14)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MJS

You will find on each of the pages of this booklet a story about a situation in which you are involved. Each story is followed by a question. Six alternative ways of acting or looking at the situation in terms of the question are then presented. For each situation you are to choose the one of the six options which is closest to the type of reasoning you would employ in the particular situation. In each case mark by the number of that option next to the story number presented below. Make one and ONLY one choice for each situation. Although in some cases none of the six options will truly represent the type of reasoning you would use, choose that option which would be closest to your own reasoning. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions.

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.

1. You want very much to go on a trip with your youth group. Your father promises you that you can go if you save up the money for the trip yourself. So you work hard at your part-time job and save up the money it will cost to go on the trip and a little more besides. But just before the time of the trip, your father changes his mind. Some of his friends have decided to go on a special fishing trip, and your father is short of the money it will cost. So he asks you to give him the money you have saved from your job. You don't want to give up going on your trip so you think about refusing to give your father the money.

Does it matter that it is your father involved here, rather than someone else? Why?

(1) Yes, though only as an issue of greater emotional concern because of the nature of this relationship. My affection for him and the expectation of mutual interest would lead me to expect more from the "contract" which we made.

(2) Yes, my father is in the position to do something nice for me in return for a favor or to punish me for not doing what he asks. Others do not have as much power to do this.

(3) Yes, I have a responsibility to my father and an obligation to honor his wishes. This is an opportunity for me to repay him for things he has done for me in the past.

(4) Yes, obligations here are defined by conscience. Love or affection for my father is a value which I have chosen and I should be aware of the implications of that choice.

(5) Yes, I should feel gratitude and appreciation for what my father has done for me in the past. His affection is important to me. I should be concerned for his feelings and willing to act unselfishly.

(6) Yes, it is my duty to do what my father asks and give him the money. Obedience to my father is essential.

2. You want to go on the trip but you are afraid to refuse to give your father the money. So you give him \$10 and tell him that is all you have made. You take your remaining \$40 and pay for your trip with it. You tell your father that the director said you could pay later. So you go off on your trip and your father doesn't go on his fishing trip.

Before you leave on your trip, you tell your younger brother that you really have made \$50 and that you lied to your father and said that you had made only \$10. He is now wondering if he should tell your father or not.

Why would you think your brother should not tell your father what he knows?

(1) I won't trust him anymore if he does and he may very well need me to do the same thing for him someday.

(2) Keeping secrets is a necessary part of maintaining friendships. He knows that I won't desire his friendship if I can't trust him.

(3) He shouldn't see the need to tell him. He should respect my rights as those of anyone else and respect my ability to make decisions and to tell whomever I choose.

(4) He has a right to privacy, if my father doesn't ask he's really not doing anything wrong. He is merely withholding information which has not been requested.

(5) He shouldn't tell because he is younger than I am and therefore shouldn't break his word to me. I have more power and authority than he does. If he breaks his word he risks the consequences of going against that authority.

(6) I told him because I trusted him and thought I could rely on him. If he tells, he'll force reconsideration of that trust.

3. Your mother is near death from a special form of cancer. There is one drug that the doctors think might save her. It is a form of radium that a druggist in your town has recently discovered. The drug is expensive to make, but the druggist is charging ten times what the drug costs him to make. He pays \$200 for the radium and charges \$2,000 for a small dose of the drug. You have gone to everyone you know to borrow the money, but you can only get together about \$1,000, which is half of what it costs. You tell the druggist that your mother is dying and ask him to sell it to you cheaper or let you pay later. But the druggist says, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So you get desperate and break into the man's store to steal the drug for your mother.

Why shouldn't you steal the drug?

(1) I am quite desperate in this situation and I may not truly realize I'm doing wrong when I steal the drug. But I'll certainly know I've done wrong after I'm punished and sent to jail. I'll always feel guilty about being dishonest and breaking the law.

(2) I may not get much of a jail term if I steal the drug, but my mother will probably die before I get out so it won't do me much good. If my mother dies, I shouldn't blame myself, it isn't my fault she has cancer.

(3) I'll get caught and sent to jail if I do. If I get away my conscience will bother me thinking how the police will catch up with me at any minute.

(4) It isn't just the druggist who will think I am a criminal, everyone else will too. After I steal it, I'll feel bad thinking how I've brought dishonor on my family and myself; I won't be able to face anyone again.

(5) If I stole the drug, I wouldn't be blamed by other people but I'd condemn myself because I wouldn't have lived up to my own conscience and standards of honesty.

(6) I would lose my standing and respect in the community and violate the law. I'd lose respect for myself if I'm carried away by emotion and forget the long term effects of my action.

4. The drug didn't work and there is no other treatment known to medicine which can save your mother, so you know she has only about six months to live. She is in terrible pain and in her calm periods she asks you to give her enough of her medicine to kill her. She says she can't stand the pain and she is going to die in a few months anyway.

How would the law influence your decision in this instance?

(1) I'd consider the rules about killing, but with the view that they should not be finally determining here. The sympathetic nature of my killing her out of mercy makes the action not really murder.

(2) No one has the right to take someone else's life and mercy killing is in fact violation of the law, but I would expect modification of the law in this situation.

(3) I would hesitate to institutionalize or legalize mercy killing since human life retains its value even under conditions of pain, but I would be conscious of the necessity to value human personality and life in other than physical terms.

(4) Killing her wouldn't be bad because it has no effects, she would die anyway. I could avoid legal complications by getting her permission in writing, suggesting suicide, or making the death look natural.

(5) I wouldn't see murder rules or laws as binding in this situation. It is hardly murder when agreement and consent of the "victim" are involved.

(6) It is against the law to torture people and make them suffer. By refusing to give her the drug, I'm violating this law.

5. Imagine your country has been attacked in war. You are fighting in a company of troops which is way outnumbered and is retreating before the enemy. Your company has crossed a bridge over a river, but the enemy is still on the other side. If someone goes back to the bridge and blows it up, with the head start the rest of the company would have, they could probably escape alive; there will be about a 4 to 1 chance that he will be killed. You, the leader, are the one who knows best how to lead the retreat. You ask for volunteers, but no one will volunteer. If you go yourself, the troops will probably not get back safely and you are the only one who knows how to lead the retreat.

Do you have the right to order a man to go if you think that is the best thing to do? Why?

(1) Yes, it is part of my job to see that respect is maintained. Respect for my position is a symbol of respect for the rules and laws of society. It is therefore my duty to exercise the power associated with my position.

(2) Yes, in this instance I am aware of what is in the best interest of all. I can better understand the circumstances than my subordinates as well as being aware of their point of view.

(3) Yes, I have been placed in command of the company. Anything I have the power to command I also have the right to command.

(4) Yes, I have the right in that the others in the company, including the man ordered to go, would see the necessity for my order. I give the order with the understanding that my request is something the man ordered to comply with would himself choose to do.

(5) Yes, I have the right to order my troops to do whatever I consider necessary. They may not respect my authority, but they must obey my commands.

(6) Yes, according to the rules of military command, I have the right to order a man to do this. However, I must also recognize that individual autonomy of a subordinate allows him the right to refuse to comply.

6. You have finally decided to order one of the men to stay behind. You think it is best to pick one of your two demolition men. Both of these men have been trained to use dynamite to blow up bridges and fortifications at the least risk to themselves. One of the demolition men has a lot of strength and courage, but is a bad troublemaker. He is always stealing things, beating up the other men, and not doing his work. The second demolition man has gotten a bad disease and is likely to die in a short time anyway, though he is strong enough now to do the job.

How should either of these men feel about obedience to your orders, as opposed to a request from another person to do the same thing?

(1) It is worse not to obey my official orders because it does more harm. It is deviation against the government, or public service, rather than against an individual.

(2) Though my request may be more directly relevant to the general social system, one man's request or order holds no more weight than that of another.

(3) My position of authority comes from the trust and respect which the company has placed in my judgment-- the exercise of that authority is like the return of an act of trust. It would seem most important to be consistent with that trust in obeying my orders.

(4) He should feel that it is not that bad to refuse my order because a refusal would not affect me that much. I am in the position to order another man to do the same thing.

(5) It would be worse not to obey my order because I give so much in my responsibility for the company and work so hard to get things done in the ways that are best for all.

(6) He should realize that it is always worse to disobey the request of an authority than that of anyone else.

7. In your town a few years ago there was a poor man who could find no work. Without money, he stole food and medicine that he needed for himself and his family. He was captured and sentenced to prison for six years. After a year, he escaped from prison and went to live in another part of the country under a new name. He saved money and slowly built up a big factory. He gave his workers the highest wages and used most of his profits to build a hospital for people who couldn't afford good medical care. A number of years has passed since that time. You see the factory owner and recognize him as being the same man-- the escaped convict whom the police have been looking for back in your home town.

What would be your feelings about the punishment he now deserves?

(1) It would be very wrong to punish a man who thought he was doing the correct and moral thing. He has more than adequately demonstrated his respect for other men and his commitment to right. He shouldn't be punished.

(2) He broke the law and was sentenced. The rest of his sentence is yet to be served.

(3) Neither his motives nor intent at the time of the crime were evil. Minimal punishment would be sufficient to indicate that stealing is not a practice to be followed.

(4) Illegal acts are wrong, regardless of the motive. In spite of the fact that he has acted favorably since the time of the crime, I can appreciate the position of the victim of his crime and see the need for his punishment.

(5) He has undone the harm which he caused and there would therefore be little need to punish him.

(6) Someone should not be punished in a situation where everyone would be expected to do the same thing; laws come from the will of the community and the will of the community in this instance would be not to punish.

8. You are involved in war and your city is often bombed by the enemy. So each person in the city has been given a post to go to right after the bombing to help put out the fires the bombs started and to rescue people in burning buildings. You have been made the chief in charge of one fire engine post. The post is near where you work so you can get there quickly during the day, but it is a long way from your home. One day there is heavy bombing and you leave the shelter in the place you work and go toward your fire station. But when you see how much of the city is burning, you get worried about your family. So you decide you have to go home first to see if your family is safe, even though your home is a long way off and the station is nearby and there is somebody assigned to protect your family's area.

Was it right for you to do this? Why?

(1) No, I should respect all persons' rights equally. By leaving my post I'm showing that I don't have that respect. It is inconsistent with equal regard for all men and the rights of all to equal treatment.

(2) No, the authority and power of those above me requires me to go to my post under such circumstances. I act here in violation of those commands.

(3) No, if I am to expect protection for myself and my family I must earn that by doing my assigned job.

(4) No, if I do this I am violating the rights of others to protection. My personal rights can only come from a general social order.

(5) No, I am putting myself in a lot more danger by going across the city. My first duty is to myself, not others. I should stay at my post.

(6) No, I am expected by others in the town to be at my post; I am not doing my expected job in deserting my station.

9. Imagine that you are living before the Civil War and that there are laws that allow slavery. According to the law, if a slave escapes, he has to be returned to his owner like a runaway horse. You don't believe in slavery and disobey the law and hide runaway slaves and help them to escape.

Relate your feelings about slavery to your actions in this situation.

(1) Laws shouldn't interfere with individual rights. I have a responsibility to protect those rights for others since they form the basis of our whole system of justice.

(2) Every human life has a right to respect and equal treatment. Slavery laws violate these rights and go against the principles of human dignity and conscience.

(3) Slavery is wrong; you can't own other people. However, as the law stands, it is wrong to help escaped slaves.

(4) People with more power have a right to control those with less. The law says that slavery is legal, by acting in this way I break the law.

(5) I did break the law, but I don't know if it's right to have laws which restrict other rights.

(6) Everyone has a right to do what he wants, the law can't tell me how to live my life.

10. Imagine that you are the owner of a rooming house which holds seven rooms. The rent from the rooming house provides you with just enough money to make ends meet.

All of your roomers are white and you know them very well. They have told you that if you ever rent a room to a Negro they would move out. If this happens you will receive much less money than the small amount you now receive. But you also know that if you refuse a Negro a room you could get into trouble because the open housing law makes it illegal for you to refuse to rent a room to a person because of his race.

A young Black man, Mr. Jones, has just received a job in town. He has looked around the town all day for housing without success and toward evening notices the sign "Room for Rent" in front of your house. When he asks you about the room, you tell him that you have just rented the room and that there are no more rooms left. In fact, there are two vacant rooms in your house at the time.

Should you have the right to say who lives in your rooming house? Why?

(1) Yes, I work hard for the small amount I get from the house. I have a right to what I earn and no one can ask me to give that up for them.

(2) Yes, ideally, but property cannot be owned and controlled outside of a system of general justice where each man's rights and duties are respected equally, discrimination goes totally against that equality.

(3) Yes, I have the right to control my own property. It's none of the business of the people to whom the house does not belong. I have absolute rights in matters concerning my house.

(4) Yes, I should be able to expect my tenants to value my property and appreciate my need to maintain a full rooming house, an impossibility if I allow a Black man to move into the house.

(5) Yes, but I must recognize that property rights come only from individual rights and by not equally respecting the rights of all I risk forfeiting the right to control my property.

(6) Yes, I own the house and people who live there are under my authority.

11. You have a very close relationship with a girl during your senior year in high school. Separated for the summer, you grow apart and return with very mixed feelings about one another. One evening, feeling again your former closeness and attraction, you go further and further and have sexual intercourse. A few weeks later you find out that she is pregnant.

What would be your feelings about abortion in this instance?

(1) It's not really killing. The fetus is not really alive. It's killing something that was never really there. The life isn't worth anything to the baby and it can only cause trouble for me.

(2) It's an unborn baby, that's the whole point. If a kid isn't born I can't see how anyone can say he's alive. Even little kids, babies when they're just born, the only reason they're alive is because someone knows them. And so the only people that they really hurt if they die are their parents. But if this kid isn't born yet, then I don't--nobody knows him. It wouldn't be hurting anyone.

(3) Life is a universal human right. The life of the fetus, apart from all of the considerations of difficulty for me has value in its own right, and deserves the equal treatment of any human being.

(4) Life should be considered in the context of the baby's future. It should be viewed not as a biological phenomenon but as an attitude of respect for personality and justice. The fetus exhibits only the biological aspects of life and the chances for respect for its personality and justice for it in the future under these circumstances seem limited.

(5) Physically the fetus hardly exists, one way or the other it really makes very little difference.

(6) An unborn baby has just as much right to live as anyone else and I don't think that I or anyone else has the right to decide whether it should live or not. Life is sacred and humans have not the right to terminate it.

12. Your parents are away for the weekend and you are alone in the house. Unexpectedly, on Friday evening your girlfriend comes over. You spend the evening together in the house and after a while start necking, petting and have sexual intercourse.

What considerations would lead you to think your behavior wrong in this instance?

(1) It would be wrong if we had sexual intercourse without any thought about pregnancy because of the inconvenience--a child could cause a lot of disturbance--especially to kids in high school.

(2) If we did not have intercourse we would show discipline and our ability to wait for marriage when sex will be more meaningful for us and more satisfying because it will not be in violation of social and religious norms.

(3) Because of our youth and even minimally dependent relationships on our parents, we cannot fully respond to considerations of personal dignity and responsibility most necessary under such circumstances.

(4) If pregnancy resulted from intercourse in this instance my parents would be most upset and even my friends might shy away from me.

(5) Since we were not totally convinced of the rightness of our actions and able to fit them into a logically thought out pattern, we would be apt to be bothered by conscience or other consideration.

(6) Sex in this instance could be an example of our using each other for personal advantage. It would be very difficult at this age to have built a relationship of real honesty and trust which would eliminate the difficulties of personal advantage seeking.

13. You are thinking about putting out a mimeographed newspaper for students in your school which would express many of your strong feelings. In particular, you want to voice your opposition to the war in Viet Nam and to many of the school's regulations.

Before publishing your newspaper, you ask your principal for permission. The principal agrees on the condition that you submit all of your articles to him for approval. You agree and begin to submit your articles. The principal approves all of them and you publish two issues of the paper in the next two weeks.

The principal has not thought about the great attention your newspaper would receive. Students read the paper eagerly and are beginning to organize against school rules. Many classes are spent talking about the paper and rallies are held before and after school. Furthermore, many parents who favor the Viet Nam war are phoning the principal and angrily telling him that the newspaper is unpatriotic and should not be published.

As a result of the commotion, the principal considers ordering you to stop publishing the newspaper. He gives as a reason that your activities are disruptive to the operation of the school.

If you had advocated the dropping of nuclear bombs on North Viet Nam and China, what difference, if any, should this have made on the consideration of your rights to continue publication?

(1) Rights and duties are very different. In this case it would seem that legally I would have the right to publish what I want, but the rightness of my actions in the latter case would be doubtful. My rights here come from equal respect for others' rights--publication of the latter articles would not show that respect.

(2) It's nobody else's business what I write in my newspaper. I have absolute rights to write and publish whatever I want.

(3) It's all in the hands of the principal. If the latter position were less acceptable to him, then my rights to their publication would also be less.

(4) I have worked to publish this newspaper. That right to publish is mine in spite of others' interpretations of my use of it as good or bad. I have the right to publish what I choose to publish.

(cont.)

13. (Cont.)

(5) A student newspaper should express the views of students in general. The latter positions do not fairly represent these views and therefore I don't have as much right to publish them.

(6) Equal rights have meaning only within a system of general justice for all. The latter positions are in violation of the principles of that justice. I can expect the rights to consistently publish what I want only if I am personally consistent in upholding an equal justice for all.

14. You have gotten into serious trouble. You are secretly leaving town in a hurry and need money. You can't get it from anyone you know and you are faced with going to a retired old man who is known to help people in the town. If you tell this man that you are very sick and need \$500.00 to pay for an operation, he will give it to you. Really you aren't sick at all and have no intention of paying the man back. Although he does not know you very well, he would loan you the money.

How important is it that you tell the truth in this instance?

(1) The old man gives money to people he doesn't even know. It really shouldn't matter to him what the money is used for. It's not like I'd be lying to someone I know and who depends on me. What I say to him really makes little difference.

(2) My telling the truth is essential. Truth forms the whole basis of our social order; it's something I have the right to expect and people must expect from me.

(3) Since I need the money so badly, the truth matters very little. I should do and say what I have to in order to get the money.

(4) The value of my word goes beyond situational considerations. Justice and respect for human dignity can only be upheld in the context of consistent truth.

(5) If this man is willing to give me money, he has earned the right to expect the truth from me.

(6) He has lots of money and power so his word is important. I don't have any money or power, so my word is worth very little one way or the other.

15. One day the air raid sirens begin to sound. Everyone realizes that a hydrogen bomb is going to be dropped on the city by the enemy and that the only way to survive will be in a bomb shelter. Not everyone has bomb shelters, but those who do have enough air space inside to last you and your family five days. You know that after five days the fallout will have diminished to the point where you could safely leave the shelter. If you leave before that, you will die. There is enough air for you and your family alone. Your next door neighbors have not built a shelter and are trying to get in yours. You know that you will not have enough air if you let the neighbors in, and that you will all die if they come inside. So you refuse to let them in.

Now the neighbors are trying to break the door down in order to get in. You take your rifle and tell them to go away or else you will shoot. They won't go away. You either have to shoot them or let them come into the shelter.

Why should you shoot?

(1) I have the most power in this situation and I must do what it will require to hold that position.

(2) Society is based on living up to special obligations of contract or agreement. The special obligations to my family require that I see first to their protection in this instance.

(3) There is nothing to be gained from letting them in and much to be lost from their entrance. I have no responsibility to protect them.

(4) I have placed myself in a position where my family depends on me. In spite of love and all other considerations I owe more to those who depend on me than I owe to humans in general. I must protect my family first.

(5) My family is more important to me and personal affection makes my duty to protect them the most binding.

(6) My rights to property are essential here. My family must see me as responsible and reliable in my care for them.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



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December, 1975

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